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1.1.0 (current) Rating: Positive Thoroughness: Low Understanding: Medium

Approved without comment by kornelski on 2021-01-06


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Grepped for -i cipher, -i crypto, 'fs', 'net', 'unsafe' and there were no hits except for one unsafe.

The lambda where unsafe is used is never invoked (e.g. the unsafe code never runs) and is only introduced for some compile-time checks. Additional unsafe review comments can be found in https://crrev.com/c/5353376.

This crate has been added to Chromium in https://crrev.com/c/3736562. The CL description contains a link to a document with an additional security review.

No dependencies and completely a compile-time crate as advertised. Uses unsafe in one module as a compile-time check only: mem::transmute and ptr::write are wrapped in an impossible-to-run closure.

cargo-vet does not verify reviewers' identity. You have to fully trust the source the audits are from.

safe-to-run

This crate can be compiled, run, and tested on a local workstation or in controlled automation without surprising consequences. More…

does-not-implement-crypto (implies crypto-safe)

Inspection reveals that the crate in question does not attempt to implement any cryptographic algorithms on its own.

Note that certification of this does not require an expert on all forms of cryptography: it's expected for crates we import to be "good enough" citizens, so they'll at least be forthcoming if they try to implement something cryptographic. When in doubt, please ask an expert.

crypto-safe
Implied by other criteria

All crypto algorithms in this crate have been reviewed by a relevant expert.

Note: If a crate does not implement crypto, use does-not-implement-crypto, which implies crypto-safe, but does not require expert review in order to audit for.

safe-to-deploy (implies safe-to-run)

This crate will not introduce a serious security vulnerability to production software exposed to untrusted input. More…

ub-risk-1 (implies ub-risk-2)

Excellent soundness.

Full description of the audit criteria can be found at https://github.com/google/rust-crate-audits/blob/main/auditing_standards.md#ub-risk-1

ub-risk-2 (implies ub-risk-3)
Implied by other criteria

Negligible unsoundness or average soundness.

Full description of the audit criteria can be found at https://github.com/google/rust-crate-audits/blob/main/auditing_standards.md#ub-risk-2

ub-risk-3 (implies ub-risk-4)
Implied by other criteria

Mild unsoundness or suboptimal soundness.

Full description of the audit criteria can be found at https://github.com/google/rust-crate-audits/blob/main/auditing_standards.md#ub-risk-3

ub-risk-4
Implied by other criteria

Extreme unsoundness.

Full description of the audit criteria can be found at https://github.com/google/rust-crate-audits/blob/main/auditing_standards.md#ub-risk-4

unknown

May have been packaged automatically without a review


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To review the actual code of the crate, it's best to use cargo crev open static_assertions. Alternatively, you can download the tarball of static_assertions v1.1.0 or view the source online.