15 breaking releases
0.18.0 | Jul 18, 2024 |
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0.16.0 | May 10, 2024 |
0.15.0 | Mar 4, 2024 |
0.14.0 | Oct 2, 2023 |
0.3.0 | May 27, 2022 |
#1752 in Cryptography
24 downloads per month
Used in 2 crates
(via proof_system)
660KB
15K
SLoC
saver
Verifiable encryption using SAVER
Implementation based on SAVER
. Implemented
- using
Groth16
- as well as
LegoGroth16
.
The basic idea of the verifiable encryption construction is to split the message to be encrypted (a field element) into small chunks
of say b
bits and encrypt each chunk in an exponent variant of Elgamal encryption. For decryption, discrete log problem in the
extension field (F_{q^k}
) is solved with brute force where the discrete log is of at most b
bits so 2^b - 1
iterations.
The SNARK (Groth16) is used for prove that each chunk is of at most b
bits, thus a range proof.
The encryption outputs a commitment in addition to the ciphertext. For an encryption of message m
, the commitment psi
is of the following form:
psi = m_1*Y_1 + m_2*Y_2 + ... + m_n*Y_n + r*P_2
m_i
are the bit decomposition of the original message m
such that m_1*{b^{n-1}} + m_2*{b^{n-2}} + .. + m_n
(big-endian) with b
being the radix in which m
is decomposed and r
is the randomness of the commitment. eg if m
= 325 and m
is decomposed in 4-bit chunks, b
is 16 (2^4) and decomposition is [1, 4, 5] as 325 = 1 * 16^2 + 4 * 16^1 + 5 * 16^0
.
Getting a commitment to the full message from commitment to the decomposition.
To use the ciphertext commitment for equality of a committed message using a Schnorr protocol, the commitment must be transformed
to a commitment to the full (non-decomposed) message. This is implemented with ChunkedCommitment
and its docs describe the process.
Use with BBS+ signature
See the tests.rs file
License: Apache-2.0
Dependencies
~7–19MB
~213K SLoC